In the late eighteenth century, battles raged in almost every corner of Europe, as
well as in the Middle East, South Africa, the West Indies, and Latin America. In reality,
however, there was only one major war during this time, the war between Britain and France.
All other battles were ancillary to this larger conflict, and were often at least partially related
to its antagonists' goals and strategies.
France sought total domination of Europe. This goal was obstructed by British
independence and Britain's efforts throughout the continent to thwart Napoleon;
through treaties, Britain built coalitions (not dissimilar in concept to today's NATO) guaranteeing
British participation in all major European conflicts. These two antagonists were poorly matched,
insofar as they had very unequal strengths: France was predominant on land, Britain at sea.
The French knew that, short of defeating the British navy, their only hope of victory was to close
all the ports of Europe to British ships.
Accordingly, France set out to overcome Britain by extending its military domination from Moscow
to Lisbon, from Jutland to Calabria. All of this entailed tremendous risk, because France did not
have the military resources to control this much territory and still protect itself and maintain
order at home.
French strategists calculated that a navy of 150 ships would provide the force necessary
to defeat the British navy. Such a force would give France a three-to-two advantage over Britain.
This advantage was deemed necessary because of Britain's superior sea skills and
technology, and also because Britain would be fighting a defensive war, allowing it to
win with fewer forces. Napoleon never lost sight of
his goal, because Britain represented the last substantial impediment to his control of Europe.
As his force neared that goal, Napoleon grew increasingly impatient and began
planning an immediate attack.